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Abstract—We develop a new approach for building crypto-
graphic implementations. Our approach goes the last mile
and delivers assembly code that is provably functionally cor-
rect, protected against side-channels, and as efficient as hand-
written assembly. We illustrate our approach using ChaCha20-
Poly1305, one of the mandatory ciphersuites in TLS 1.3, and
deliver formally verified vectorized implementations which
outperform the fastest non-verified code.
We realize our approach by combining the Jasmin frame-
work, which offers in a single language features of high-level
and low-level programming, and the EasyCrypt proof assistant,
which offers a versatile verification infrastructure that supports
proofs of functional correctness and equivalence checking.
Neither of these tools had been used for functional correct-
ness before. Taken together, these infrastructures empower
programmers to develop efficient and verified implementations
by “game hopping”, starting from reference implementations
that are proved functionally correct against a specification, and
gradually introducing program optimizations that are proved
correct by equivalence checking.
We also make several contributions of independent interest,
including a new and extensible verified compiler for Jasmin,
with a richer memory model and support for vectorized
instructions, and a new embedding of Jasmin in EasyCrypt.
1. Introduction
Vulnerabilities in cryptographic libraries are challenging
to detect and/or eliminate using approaches based on testing
or fuzzing. This has motivated the use of formal verification
for proving functional correctness and side-channel protection
for modern cryptographic libraries [15], [19], [20], [32].
These approaches have been very successful, to the extent that
some of these verified libraries have been deployed in popular
products like Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Android,
etc. Despite their success, these approaches compromise on
efficiency, trust, and adoptability:
efficiency Zinzindohoue et al [32] and Erbsen et al [19]
produce verified C libraries that are as efficient as
unverified C counterparts, for instance in the OpenSSL
library. However, many state-of-the-art cryptographic
libraries are often written directly in assembly and
outperform C implementations thanks to their use
of vectorized instructions and clever platform- and
algorithm-specific optimizations. Bond et al [15] verify
assembly implementations but their implementations
are not as fast as unverified assembly implementations;
trust it is theoretically possible to compile the verified
C libraries from [19], [32] with verified compilers,
such as CompCert [24], which provably preserves
the functional correctness of programs. However it is
practically important to compile these libraries using a
non-verified and aggressively optimizing compiler (e.g.,
Clang or gcc) in order to achieve reasonable levels
of efficiency. Therefore, the C compiler is implicitly
assumed to preserve functional correctness of programs.
Moreover, it is also implicitly assumed that compilation
preserves protection against timing attacks. A similar
issue arises with the work of Fromherz et al. [20], who
verify C implementations with inlined assembly.
adoptability the aforementioned approaches are primarily
targetted to a posteriori verification of implementations
produced by cryptographers, and do not aim to provide
a practical framework that can be used by cryptographic
engineers to simultaneously optimize and contribute to
the formal verification of high-speed and high-assurance
implementations.
In this paper we go the last mile: we develop a practical
framework that can be used by cryptographic engineers to
build high-assurance and high-speed implementations that
are as fast or even faster than their non-verified counterparts.
Methodology. Our methodology allows developers to follow
the typical optimization process for low-level code. We start
from a readable reference implementation, for which we
prove functional correctness. We then gradually transform
the reference implementation into an optimized (possibly
platform-specific and vectorized) implementation, and prove
that each transformation preserves functional correctness.
This approach is similar to the “game-hopping” technique
used in provable security, except that we use it for functional
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correctness of implementations rather than security of high-
level algorithms. In parallel, we check that implementations
are safe using static analysis techniques, as the previous
proofs are carried out in a simpler semantics, which assumes
that programs are safe, and compiler correctness is generally
stated for safe programs. As a final step, we prove that that
the optimized implementations correctly deploy mitigation
against timing attacks: we adopt the cryptographic constant-
time approach [2], and prove that both the control flow and
the memory accesses performed by the optimized program
are independent of secret values.
This simple approach has important conceptual benefits.
It emulates the developer’s mental process for writing opti-
mized implementations, and imposes a convenient separation
of concerns between optimization and verification. It also
minimizes and helps structuring verification work: functional
correctness of the reference implementation is established
once and for all, even if the reference implementation is
used to derive several platform-specific implementations.
Moreover, correctness of transformations can be factored out
using generic lemmas.
Software infrastructure. We realize our methodology using
Jasmin [1], a language and compiler for high-assurance
and high-speed cryptography, and EasyCrypt [8], [9], a
proof assistant for provable security. The Jasmin language
is designed to support “assembly in the head” programming,
i.e. it smoothly combines high-level (structured control-flow,
variables, etc.) and low-level (assembly instructions, flag
manipulation, etc.) constructs. This combination makes it
possible to program by “game-hopping”. The EasyCrypt
proof assistant supports program logics for reasoning about
correctness and equivalence of imperative programs. It has
been used to mechanize “game hopping” security proofs for
many cryptographic schemes. Neither Jasmin nor EasyCrypt
has been used previously for proving functional correctness
of implementations. However, taken together, they provide
a convenient framework to develop efficient verified imple-
mentations by “game hopping”.
We formally verify Jasmin implementations. These im-
plementations are predictably transformed into assembly
programs by the Jasmin compiler. Predictability empowers
Jasmin programmers to develop optimized implementations
with essentially the same level of control as if they were
using assembly or domain-specific languages such as qhasm.
Moreover the compiler is verified (in the Coq proof assistant)
thus guarantees are carried to assembly code.
Technical contributions. We build on Jasmin and Easy-
Crypt to instantiate a new methodology for the develop-
ment of high-speed and high-assurance crypto code and
demonstrate the resulting framerwork by giving new, fully
verified, assembly implementations of standard cryptographic
algorithms that are fastest than their best known (non-verified)
counterparts. In detail, our technical contributions are as
follows:
1) We enhance the Jasmin framework with a richer mem-
ory model, supporting values of different sizes, several
language extensions, including intrinsics for vectorized
instructions, and a new compiler design that favors
extensibility. We leverage these enhancements and use
our “game hopping” approach to obtain highly optimized
vectorized implementations for ChaCha20, Poly1305 and
Gimli;
2) We implement an embedding of Jasmin programs in the
EasyCrypt proof assistant [8]. The embedding naturally
supports proofs of functional equivalence and functional
correctness. We also develop a variant of the embed-
ding to support automatic proofs of protection against
side-channel attacks, concretely that control flow and
memory accesses are independent from secret inputs (aka.
cryptographic constant-time);
3) We prove functional correctness of reference implementa-
tions, and equivalence between reference and optimized
implementations for ChaCha20, Poly1305 and Gimli.
Statements of functional correctness for the first two
primitives are taken from, or given in a style similar to,
HACL?, to guarantee formal interoperability. In the case
of Gimli we show how to use a readable Jasmin reference
implementation, which can be syntactically very close
to the specification given in cryptographic standards, as
a goal for proving functional correctness of optimized
code.
We note that a crucial factor in achieving these results
is our ability to tame the verification effort by relying on
equivalence checking. Due to the characteristics of Jasmin,
the verification workload for the reference implementations
is comparable (or even smaller, due to the less elaborate
memory model) to that of carrying out formal verification
of C code. The power of the relational reasoning offered by
EasyCrypt permits bridging reference implementations and
optimized implementations with relatively low effort, and
the automation offered by the tool suffices to deal with proof
goals for side-channel protection.
Limitations. We have only demonstrated our approach for
selected primitives and x86 platforms. However, we plan
to exploit extensibility of our compiler to support ARM
platforms. Moreover, we plan to cover a broader range of
primitives, and note that compatibility with HACL? specifica-
tions would make it possible to use Jasmin implementations
as drop off replacements of HACL? implementations for
ChaCha20 and Poly1305.
Software and proofs. Available at https://github.com/
jasmin-lang/jasmin and https://github.com/tfaoliveira/libjc
Outline. In the next section we use an example to illustrate
our methodology. In Section 3 we describe our extensions
to Jasmin and in Section 4 we describe the supporting
development in EasyCrypt. Then, in Sections 5 and 6 we
describe our other case studies and provide a thorough per-
formance evaluation of our code in comparison to alternative
implementations. Related work is reviewed in Section 7 and
concluding remarks appear in Section 8.
2. Motivating example: Poly1305
We illustrate our methodology using Poly1305 [13], an
authentication algorithm that is used together with ChaCha20
as one of the two mandatory ciphersuites for TLS 1.3.
Poly1305 is a one-time authenticator (the key should only be
used once) that allows the sender to attach a cryptographic
tag t to a transmitted message m. The receiver of the message
should be able to derive the same session key k autonomously,
and recompute the tag on the received message. If the tags
match, the receiver is assured that only the sender could
have transmitted it, provided k is secret and authentic.
Algorithm overview. Poly1305 takes a 32-byte one-time
key k and a message m and it produces a 16-byte tag t. The
key k is seen as a pair (r, s), in which each component is
treated as a 16-octet little-endian number, with the following
format restrictions: octets r[3], r[7], r[11] and r[15] should
have their top 4 bits cleared, whereas octets r[4], r[8] and
r[12] are required to have their two lower bits cleared. For
the purpose of this paper we will assume that k = (r, s) is
generated as a pseudorandom 256-bit string, after which r
is clamped to its correct format.
To authenticate a message m, it is split into 16-byte
blocks mi, for i ∈ [1, 2, . . . ]. Each block mi is then converted
into a 129-bit number bi by reading it as a 16-byte little-
endian value and then setting the 129-th bit to one (the last
block is treated differently). The authenticator t is computed
by sequentially accumulating each such number into an
initial state a0 = 0 according to the following formula:
ai = (ai−1 + bi)× r (mod p), for i ∈ [1, 2, . . . ] and where
p = 2130 − 5 is prime. Finally, the secret key s is added to
the accumulator (over the integers) and the tag t is simply
the lowest 128 bits of the result serialized in little-endian
order. The choice of p is crucial for optimization, as it is
close to a power of 2: modular reduction can be performed
by first reducing modulo 2130 and then adjusting the result
using a simple computation that depends on the offset 5.
Specification. Our goal is to prove that our optimized
implementation of Poly1305 is functionally correct with
respect to the high-level specification presented in Figure 1.
The specification is written in EasyCrypt and matches the
HACL? specification for Poly1305 in that the computation
of the tag is expressed as the following functional operators,
which carry out a fold over a list of values in Zp.
op poly1305_loop (r : zp) (m : Zp_msg) (n : int) =
foldl (fun h i ⇒ (h + nth m i) * r) 0Zp [0;· · ·;n−1].
op poly1305_ref (r : zp) (s : int) (m : Zp_msg) =
let h' = poly1305_loop r m (size m) in
(((asint h') % 2128 ) + s) % 2128 .
This specification is used to express the following correctness
contract over the execution of our implementations:
Glob.mem = mem ∧ args = (out,inn,inl,k) ∧
poly1305_pre r s m mem inn inl k V
poly1305_post mem Glob.mem out r s m
op poly1305_pre (r : zp) (s : int) (m : Zp_msg)
(mem : global_mem_t) (inn, inl, kk : int) =
let body i =
let offset = i * 16 in
if i < size m − 1
then load_block mem (inn+offset) 16
else load_block mem (inn+offset) (inl−offset) in
let n = ceil (inl / 16) in
m = [body 0; · · ·; body (n−1)] ∧
r = load_clamp mem kk ∧
s = to_uint (loadW128 mem (kk + 16)).
op poly1305_post mem_pre mem_post outt rr ss mm =
mem_post =
storeW128 mem_pre outt (W128.of_int (poly1305_ref rr ss mm)).
Figure 1: Poly1305 specification in EasyCrypt.
The contract relies on an axiomatic model of the Jasmin
language semantics that has been created in EasyCrypt. In
this particular case, the contract imposes that the memory
Glob.mem in the final state is identical to the initial memory,
except for the fact that it now encodes the correct authenti-
cator at position out. Correctness is defined with respect to
the values stored in the initial memory, whose contents are
interpreted (according to the encoding rules of Poly1305) as
containing a message m of length inl bytes stored at position
inn, and a key with components r and s stored at position k.
In detail, the precondition and post-condition are shown
in Figure 1. The pre-condition requires the implementation
to correctly lift the message encoded in memory to some
representation of Zp, tweaking the necessary bits as specified
by Poly1305, as defined by operators load_block and load_clamp.
We illustrate the latter:
op load_clamp(mem: global_mem_t) (ptr : address) =
let x = loadW128 mem ptr in
let xclamp =
x & (W128.of_int 0xFFFFFFC0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF) in
Zp.inzp (W128.to_uint xclamp).
Note that the lifting to Zp is represented by operators
inzp and asint. Conversely, the post-condition requires the
implementation to correctly encode the final tag (a multi-
precision integer) back into memory.
Implementations. We reach our optimized code from the
specification through a sequence of implementations:
abstract implementations: we first create an imperative
version of the specification (see Figure 4) that relies on
computations over the abstract type zp. We then apply a
series of transformations (including loop transformations
and code modularization using inlineable functions) to
obtain a code that approximates the control flow from
Figure 2, and which we explain below.
reference implementations: we replace computations in zp
with calls to functions that deal with explicit representations
of values in zp. Intuitively, this program corresponds to a
Jasmin program, whereas the abstract implementations are
just EasyCrypt programs which we use as proof artifacts.
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Figure 2: Structure the optimized Poly1305 implementation.
However, this reference implementation is not yet fully
optimized.
optimized implementations: we apply a series of trans-
formations to restructure the reference implementation in
a code that exhibits parallelism and replaces sequential
code by vectorized instructions. The final, fully optimized,
implementation in the sequence is described next.
High-speed high-assurance implementation. Our fully
optimized code takes advantage of the assembly in the
head style of programming supported by Jasmin. We rely
on the high-level constructs in Jasmin to deploy mixed
representation optimizations, which combine sequential and
parallel processing as shown in Figure 2.
The implementation first checks whether we are dealing
with a small or large message (over 256 bytes). For small
messages, it calculates the tag by representing values in
Zp packed into three 64-bit words (the most significant
word for a residue will only use 2 bits). For large messages,
a mixed representation computation is used. First, some
precomputation necessary for parallel calculations is per-
formed using the packed representation; then the values are
converted to a 5-limb representation using radix 226 stored
into five 64-bit words. This leaves room in each word so that
limb-wise multiplication can be performed safely in 64-bit
architectures, as well as accumulating multiple additive carry
operations. Parallel computation of 4 message blocks at a
time is then implemented using vectorized operations over
this representation. Finally, the result is converted back to
the packed representation and any remaining message blocks
are processed as for short messages.
The high-level control flow and (inlineable) function
modularization of Jasmin are crucial to allow managing
the code complexity, whereas the low-level features permit
controlling instruction selection and scheduling in order to
fine-tune performance. An example of our use of the low-
level features of the language is given in Figure 3. The
optimized implementation relies on AVX2 SIMD instructions,
for which Jasmin provides syntactic sugar: shift and add
operators are annotated with type information (4u64) indicat-
ing that the selected instructions act on 4 unsigned 64-bit
words in parallel. Indeed, this code snippet is a part of the
parallelized 5-limb implementation, as can be seen by the
type of the input x, which contains 4 values in Zp, each
represented using 5-limbs. All of these values are processed
in the same way using the SIMD instructions.
fn carry_reduce(reg u256[5] x, reg u256 mask26) −→ reg u256[5] {
reg u256[2] z;
reg u256 t;
z[0] = x[0] >>4u64 26; z[1] = x[3] >>4u64 26;
x[0] &= mask26; x[3] &= mask26;
x[1] +4u64= z[0]; x[4] +4u64= z[1];
z[0] = x[1] >>4u64 26; z[1] = x[4] >>4u64 26;
t = z[1] <<4u64 2;
z[1] +4u64= t;
x[1] &= mask26; x[4] &= mask26;
x[2] +4u64= z[0]; x[0] +4u64= z[1];
z[0] = x[2] >>4u64 26; z[1] = x[0] >>4u64 26;
x[2] &= mask26; x[0] &= mask26;
x[3] +4u64= z[0]; x[1] +4u64= z[1];
z[0] = x[3] >>4u64 26;
x[3] &= mask26;
x[4] +4u64= z[0];
return x;
}
Figure 3: Example of optimized Jasmin low-level code.
Correctness of abstract and reference implementations.
The proof of the baseline abstract implementation with
respect to the functional specification uses standard Hoare
logic. The proof of the remaining abstract implementations
is carried by “game hopping”, i.e. each step is justified using
relational Hoare logic.
The proof of equivalence from the baseline abstract im-
plementation uses a series of functional correctness lemmas
that modularize the computation of each operation in zp in
the two representations described above, including arithmetic,
conversion and load/store operations.
Figure 5 shows one such auxiliary lemma for the con-
version of the results of the 4 parallel computations over
the 5-limb representation to a single value over 3-limb
representation. Unlike the rest of the correctness proof, which
requires minimal effort, the proofs of these lemmas require
ingenuity and user interaction. This is because the proofs
of these auxiliary lemmas use algebraic reasoning similar
to proofs of other multi-precision computations that are
common in cryptography [17]. These proofs are reusable
and they could be partially automated (see Sections 4 and 7).
We note that this strategy of performing several hops
with abstract implementations considerably simplifies the
equivalence proofs.
Equivalence checking the vectorized implementation. At
this point in the proof, all the non-vectorized code in the
reference implementation matches the code in the extracted
Jasmin implementation. The final part of the proof connects
our reference implementation to the fully optimized code
via three hops that rely on two new dedicated EasyCrypt
features:
proc poly1305 (out in_0: address, inlen: int, k: address) : unit = {
var r,h,x: zp;
var b16: u64;
var s, h_int : int;
r ← load_clamp Glob.mem k;
h ← 0Zp ;
while (16 ≤ inlen) {
x ← load_block Glob.mem in_0 16;
h ← h + x; (* Addition in Zp *)
h ← h * r; (* Multiplication in Zp *)
in_0 ← in_0 + 16;
inlen ← inlen − 16;
}
if (0 < inlen) {
x ← load_block Glob.mem inlen in_0;
h ← h + x;
h ← h * r;
}
h_int ← (asint h) % 2128 ;
s ← W128.to_uint (loadW128 Glob.mem (k + 16));
h_int ← (h_int + s) % 2128 ;
Glob.mem ← storeW128 Glob.mem out (W128.of_int h_int);
}
Figure 4: Imperative reference specification in EasyCrypt.
lemma add_Rep5_Pack_spec hh1 hh2 hh3 hh4 :
phoare [ Mhop3.add_Rep5_Pack_Rep3 :
bRep5 27 hh1 ∧ bRep5 27 hh2 ∧ bRep5 27 hh3 ∧ bRep5 27 hh4 ∧
hh1 = h1 ∧ hh2 = h2 ∧ hh3 = h3 ∧ hh4 = h4 V
ubW64 4 res[2] ∧
repres3 res = repres5 hh1 + repres5 hh2 +
repres5 hh3 + repres5 hh4 ] = 1%r.
Figure 5: Example of representation correctness lemma. In
addition to functional correctness, the contract binds the
implementation to using only 4 bits on the most significant
output limb, assuming that all the input limbs are using at
most 27-bits.
• The first hop rearranges code so that code corresponding
to each single-instruction-multiple-data (SIMD) instruction
is modularized as a call to a procedure in a special
EasyCrypt module called Ops. Here we take advantage
of a new EasyCrypt meta-tactic that permits rearranging
n repetitions of the same sequence of k instructions into
a sequence of k blocks, each with n identical instructions
(intuitively each of these blocks corresponds to a SIMD
instruction).
• The second hop replaces calls to Ops with calls to a different
module OpsV, where the content of each procedure now
makes a single call to the corresponding SIMD instruction
(see Figure 6 for an illustrative example). This hop is
justified with a once-and-for-all proof that, using the
axiomatic semantics of Jasmin expressed in EasyCrypt,
establishes the functional equivalence of the Ops and OpsV
modules.
• The final hop simply shows that the EasyCrypt imple-
type vt4u64 = u256.
module OpsV = {
proc iVPBROADCAST_4u64(v : u64) : vt4u64 = {
return x86_VPBROADCAST_4u64 v;
} · · ·
}.
type t4u64 = u64 array4.
module Ops = {
proc iVPBROADCAST_4u64(v : u64) : t4u64 = {
var r : t4u64;
r[0] ←v; r[1] ←v; r[2] ←v; r[3] ←v;
return r;
} · · ·
}.
Figure 6: Ops and VOps modules.
mentation obtained from the previous transformation is
equivalent to the extracted optimized Jasmin code.
In Section 5 we report on other equivalence proofs we
have completed and also on the performance enhancements
obtained via the associated optimizations.
Protection against timing attacks. Low-level crypto-
graphic software implementations are expected to satisfy
a security-critical non-functional property commonly known
as constant-time, as mitigation against timing attacks. This
mitigation consists of the following two restrictions: i. all
branching operations depend only on public values (here
public is defined by explicitly identifying which parts of
the initial state can influence the control-flow); and ii. the
memory addresses that are accessed by the implementations
depend only on public values. Intuitively, these restrictions
combined with mild assumptions on the underlying hardware
processor guarantee that the execution time of the program
(even accounting for micro-architectural features like cache
memories) will be fixed once the public part of the input is
fixed, ruling out timing attacks.
It is well-known that mitigation against timing attacks
can be modeled as observational non-interference. That
is, one can define an instrumented semantics, where a
distinguished leakage variable (modeled as a list of events)
records execution of time-varying instructions, targets of
conditional jumps and memory accesses. Then, a program is
secure iff every two executions with possibly different secret
inputs (but equal public inputs) yield equal leakage.
We define an embedding of the instrumented semantics
of Jasmin programs in EasyCrypt and use this embedding
to translate our optimized implementation of Poly1305. The
proof that a program correctly implements mitigation against
timing attacks is carried with minimal user interaction using
existing tactics for relational Hoare logic.
Guarantees over assembly code. The Jasmin compiler
is formally verified for functional correctness (in Coq),
therefore we know that safe Jasmin source programs are
compiled into safe and functionally equivalent assembly
programs—we discuss safety in detail in Section 3. In
addition, Almeida et al [1] informally argue that the Jasmin
compiler preserves mitigations against timing attacks in the
constant-time model. This informal claim has been reinforced
by a formal proof that many optimization passes preserve
such mitigations [11], although the connection between these
two works has not been established yet.
Efficiency. HACL? contains a verified C implementation of
Poly1305. Vale [15] and Vale/F* [20] also prove functional
correctness of the assembly implementation of Poly1305
for 64-bit operations. In section Section 6 we compare our
code with these and other implementations and show that it
outperforms the best non-verified code for Poly1305.
We note that there is no magical way of improving
performance and we do not claim to have a way to replace the
expert programmer. Indeed, we apply the same optimization
ideas used by the best implementations, namely those adopted
in OpenSSL and [22]. What we do claim is that we have
a tool-supported methodology that allows us to bring the
expert programmer on-board in the process of verifying
functional correctness, in that many of the hand-crafted
optimization steps can be justified with equivalence-checking
proofs that are simple to carry out with the developers’ input.
This includes vectorization and instruction scheduling as
prominent examples. Furthermore, the more challenging parts
of the functional correctness proofs are not harder (one could
even argue that they are simpler due to the memory model
of Jasmin) that proofs carried out over high-level languages
such as C.
3. Jasmin language, compiler and analyzer
In this section we describe the improvements to Jas-
min required for writing our highly-optimized fully-verified
implementations. This includes language extensions and a
significant refactoring of the infrastructure and compiler.
In Appendix A we give a summary of the original key
design choices for Jasmin. Here we start by listing the main
challenges we addressed in improving previous work [1].
The original Jasmin framework [1] has been used for
writing high-speed cryptographic code. Unfortunately, this
framework exhibits three key limitations:
• simplified memory model: only 64-bit values were sup-
ported in the original Coq formalization, which excluded
implementations that rely, for example, on byte-level
access to memory or different views of arrays, and vector
instructions;
• monolithic design: the original Coq formalization was
developed in the prevailing style for verified compilers,
and not intended to be easily extensible;
• basic proof infrastructure: the original implementation
featured a verification condition generator (the standard
tool for deductive verification) and did not support the
process of writing optimized implementations described
in the previous section.
We address these issues as follows. First, we develop a
new memory model to support value of any width and
idioms for efficient low-level code. Second, we propose a
mechanism, called instruction descriptor, which incorporates
the information required to handle the instruction from source
to assembly, and implement the language and compiler based
on instruction descriptors. Third, we develop a verification
infrastructure that supports proofs by game hopping. We
develop the first two points in this section, and the third
point in the next section.
3.1. Compiler design
Compilers, and in particular verified compilers, are
typically written for well-defined source languages and
architectures. Moreover, it is generally assumed, at least
implicitly, that compiler extensions will be developed by
compiler writers. This is perfectly reasonable, but has
concrete practical implications: any extension or modification
to the compiler requires multiple modifications spread over
the codebase of the compiler. Furthermore, in the case of
verified compilers, it is also necessary to perform multiple
modifications across the compiler proof.
In our context, this status quo is unsatisfactory for
two reasons: first, the source language is not as closed
as traditional languages: in particular, it is designed to
support assembly in the head and to grow organically to
support richer sets of instructions and eventually multiple
platforms. Ideally, these extensions should be manageable by
external contributors with limited skills in formal verification.
Therefore, we introduce the notion of instruction descriptor,
which packs all the knowledge and the proof obligations
required for adding new instructions to the compiler. The
use of descriptors makes the compiler more easily extensible.
In addition, the approach is generic and applicable to other
compilers.
Machine instructions can be made available as intrinsic
operators at the source level. Due to historical reasons
and micro-architectural constraints, each instruction has a
specific “calling-convention”. For instance, many instructions
implicitly write part of their output to the flags register. Also,
several instructions operate in place: their main destination
should be the same as one of their sources. These constraints
are irrelevant to program verification and enforcing them
early in the compilation process would not bring any benefit.
As an example, the x86 MUL instruction takes two inputs:
one explicitly and the other one implicitly from the RAX
register; its output is always written to the RDX, RAX and
flags registers. On the opposite, these operators are uniformly
described as pure functions at the source level. In the case of
the #x86_MUL intrinsic, it takes two values as input and
produces seven values as output. Therefore, the compilation
of these simple instructions is not trivial: on one hand register
allocation must enforce the various architectural constraints;
on the other hand the generation of assembly code should
check that it is safe to move from a functional semantics to an
imperative one with side effects. The associated correctness
proof is also tedious and slightly involved.
Therefore, we have built a novel verified compiler infras-
tructure so that new instruction can be added by constructing
a descriptor and adding it to the development. This permits
automatically implementing compilation and extending the
correctness proof to support the new instruction. In particular,
descriptors permit extracting rules for register allocation,
as they include meta-data about which registers are read
or written by an assembly instruction, which instruction
performs memory accesses, etc. This information is also
useful to extend support for verification of non-functional
properties, in our case mitigation of timing attacks.
For instance, the descriptor for the #x86_MUL sz (non-
truncated unsigned multiplication of words of sz bits) is
constructed from the following data:
• [:: F OF; F CF; F SF; F PF; F ZF; R RDX; R RAX]
the list of destinations where to write the output values,
here implicitly to some flag registers and to the RDX
and RAX registers;
• [:: R RAX; E sz 0] the list of sources from where to
read the input values, here implicitly from the RAX
register and from the first argument;
• [:: TYoprd] the type of the emitted instruction, here it
has one operand;
• (MUL sz) the instruction to emit.
The descriptor also contains a few well-formedness argu-
ments (proved by computation) and a correctness argument
which links the high-level functional semantics of the in-
trinsic operator to the low-level imperative semantics of the
machine instruction.
As an additional advantage of this design, pseudo-
instructions can be seamlessly introduced. For instance, a
common pattern for zero-initializing a register is to XOR
it with itself. However in the Jasmin source language,
uninitialized registers have undefined values that should not
be used in computations. We have thus added an operator set0
which takes no input and returns a zero value; its descriptor
maps it to the r 7→ XOR r r instruction which takes only
one argument: its destination.
3.2. Jasmin language and memory model
Memory model. Although x86_64 microprocessors mainly
provide 64-bit registers, programs may manipulate values
of various bit widths. Ultimately, there are only registers
of 64 bits. Values of smaller sizes do fit, but some bits are
undefined. If the value is larger than what is expected by
an operation, this is not an issue: only the relevant bits are
used. The behavior when writing a small value into a register
depends on the operation and its size: the high bits of the
destination registers may be preserved or zeroed. The exact
behavior at the micro-architectural level is very intricate: it
would be unwise to expose it to the programmer. Therefore,
we define two semantics: a source semantics that is uniform
and convenient for reasoning; and a compiler semantics, in
which variables may hold “partial” values, i.e., with some
of their most significant bits being undefined.
In any case, operators at some size may be applied to
arguments of a larger size: arguments are implicitly truncated.
fn load_add(reg u64[3] h, reg u64 in, reg u64 len) −→ reg u64[3] {
reg bool cf;
reg u64 j;
stack u64[2] s;
reg u8 c;
s[0] = 0;
s[1] = 0;
j = 0;
while (j <u len) {
c = (u8)[in + j];
s[u8 (int) j] = c;
j += 1;
}
s[u8 (int) j] = 1;
cf, h[0] += s[0];
cf, h[1] += s[1] + cf;
_, h[2] += 0 + cf;
return h;
}
Figure 7: Load and add the final bytes
The compiler needs not do anything special, since this is
the semantics at the assembly level: operators extract the
relevant part from their register operands. Technically, we
require that functions have a signature and every assignment
be decorated with the type of the assigned value. By analogy
to an identity operator, assignment truncates the value to the
given type, which enables to soundly compile copies using
a (truncating) mov instructions.
Another extension that permits dealing with varying
length operations is a refinement of the memory model
specification to allow “type-punning” — reading and writing
distinct but overlapping ranges of addresses. Interestingly,
the precise behavior need not be specified in order to
prove the correctness and security of the compilation. Note
however, that to reason about Jasmin programs relying on
such memory access patterns, the instance of the memory
model might need to be refined.
Flexible views of stack arrays. To efficiently implement
functions like the C function memcpy, or the processing of
the last (potentially incomplete) block of plaintext in a stream
cipher, it is important to be able to use the same pointer to
read and store data of varying sizes. For memory accesses,
this follows a direct consequence of supporting various sizes
in Jasmin. However, the stack in Jasmin is not seen as
addressable memory at the source level, although stack arrays
are compiled as pointers into the stack. To allow the same
flexibility in stack operations, we have added a special feature
for arrays in the stack, which allows reading/writing words
of different sizes, as illustrated in Figure 7.
As can be seen in the figure, a stack array can be seen
as a contiguous sequence of bytes, which is very convenient
when only a part of the array ends up being used. Aliasing
and overlapping accesses issue may thus arise, but they are
scoped to a single array: at the source level, stack arrays as
a whole enjoy a value semantics, are disjoint, etc.
Vector instructions. Instruction descriptors and our more
general memory model allow us to integrate vector instruc-
fn shuffle_state(reg u256[4] k) −→ reg u256[4] {
k[1] = #x86_VPSHUFD_256(k[1], (4u2)[ 0, 3, 2, 1]);
k[2] = #x86_VPSHUFD_256(k[2], (4u2)[ 1, 0, 3, 2]);
k[3] = #x86_VPSHUFD_256(k[3], (4u2)[ 2, 1, 0, 3]);
return k;
}
Figure 8: Shuffling function of ChaCha20
inline fn R4(inline int c, reg u256 x) −→ reg u256 {
inline int d;
reg u256 a, b, r;
global u256 cr, dr;
cr = c;
a = #x86_VPSLLV_4u64(x, cr);
d = (4u64)[64, 64, 64, 64] - c;
dr = d;
b = #x86_VPSRLV_4u64(x, dr);
r = a ^ b;
return r;
}
Figure 9: Parallel rotation function
tions in the Jasmin language. Following the design principles
of Jasmin, we consider both generic, zero-cost, portable and
non-portable instructions.
One example of portable instructions is parallel addition.
For these operations, the language provides a convenient
syntax. For instance, the instruction x +4u64= z; in which
variables x and z have type u256, performs four parallel
64-bit additions on vectors x and z and assigns the result to
variable x.
Non-portable instructions are available through the gen-
eral syntax for intrinsics, e.g., #x86_VPSHUFD_256. This
operator shuffles the four 64-bit elements of its first argument.
The exact shuffling is specified by its second argument, which
is an 8-bit value. This value is best seen as a vector of four
2-bit numbers describing, for each element of the destination
vector, its original position in the source vector. We have
introduced a convenient syntax to represent this kind of
constant values. For example, Figure 8 shows a shuffling
routine that is part of the ChaCha20 operation.
Dynamic globals. The initial version of Jasmin allowed
parameters in source code: constants that are inlined very
early in the compilation process similarly to C macros.
However, not all constants are the same and, for performance
reasons, some constants are best stored in the code segment,
e.g., to take advantage of RIP-based addressing.1
To permit taking advantage of these features, our ex-
tension to Jasmin permits tagging local variables as global.
These will behave as any other local variable, but will be
compiled to a code-segment constant value. For this to be
possible, their value should be known at compile-time, after
expansion of parameters, function call inlining, loop unrolling
1. In this mode, the data is stored within the code segment and referenced
through a small offset relative to the current value of the instruction pointer.
and constant propagation. The compiler will ensure that
globals with equal values are merged.
This is a very useful mechanism, when an immediate
argument to an instruction is best described by a computation,
as in vector instructions in which the immediate value
describes a permutation, or a vector of shift counts. As
an example, the R4 function shown in Figure 9 performs
four parallel rotations on a vector of 64-bit values. The first
argument is a vector of inline values that correspond to the
bit counts of these different rotations. These rotations are
implemented using one left shift by the given bit count, one
right shift by the complementary bit count, and a final XOR
of the results of the two shifts. The bit counts are computed
as inline values and stored in the code segment.
3.3. Compiler correctness and safety analysis
We have formalized the operational semantics of Jasmin
programs and x86 assembly code in the Coq proof assistant.
The formalization is based on the new memory model, and
supports instruction extensions, including SIMD. We have
also developed an extensible compiler architecture based on
instruction descriptors, and proved that the compiler is correct.
This means that the result of the compilation preserves the
semantics of the original Jasmin program, assuming that the
program is well-typed, safe, terminating, and accepted by
the compiler—the compiler may still fail for well-typed and
safe programs, for instance because the compiler does not
perform spilling.
We have also extended the Jasmin compiler to verify that
the source program is safe, using a fully automated static
analyser, as well as terminating, using a simple analysis
based on ranking functions. Concretely, for safety we check
for the absence of division by zero, out-of-bound array
accesses and variable initialization. Moreover, we need to
ensure that, during the execution of the Jasmin program,
all loads and stores take place in allocated chunks of the
memory (i.e. a specification of valid memory regions, which
define the memory calling contract). We do not require
the user to supply the static analyser with the allocated
memory ranges. Instead, we automatically compute an over-
approximation of the offsets that must be allocated in the
memory. Once the analysis is complete, the user is notified
of the inferred ranges, which are sufficient conditions under
which the program is safe. Since the offsets accessed in the
memory may depend on the inputs of the program, these
are symbolic conditions involving the initial value of the
inputs. We consider polyhedral conditions, i.e. conjunctions
of linear inequalities. For example, in the case of Poly1305,
we automatically infer the following ranges:
range(out): out+ [0; 16[ range(inlen): ∅
range(k) : k+ [0; 32[ range(in) : in+ [0; inlen[
Our analysis is based on abstract interpretation tech-
niques [18], and uses the Apron [23] library of numerical
domains. To over-approximate the memory accesses, we
use a symbolic points-to abstraction combined with the
polyhedra domain. Operations in the polyhedra domain
have a worst-case exponential complexity in the number
of variables. Therefore, we perform a pre-analysis to detect
which variables must be included in the relational domain.
Moreover, we allow to user to help the analysis by indicating
which input variables are pointers (k,in and out in Poly1305),
and which variables must be included in the relational domain
(inlen in Poly1305).
4. Source-level verification
This section describes our embedding of Jasmin in
EasyCrypt. We use this embedding for proving correctness
of reference implementations, equivalence between reference
and optimized implementations, and finally correct mitigation
of timing attacks.
4.1. Overview of EasyCrypt
EasyCrypt [8] is a general-purpose proof assistant for
proving properties of probabilistic computations with adver-
sarial code. It has been used for proving security of several
primitives and protocols [3], [7], [9], [10].
EasyCrypt implements program logics for proving proper-
ties of imperative programs. In contrast to common practices
(which use shallow or deep embeddings), the language
and program logics are hard-coded in EasyCrypt—and thus
belong to the Trusted Computing Base. The main program
logics of EasyCrypt are Hoare logic, and relational Hoare
logics—both operate on probabilistic programs but we only
used their deterministic fragments. The relational Hoare logic
allows to relate two programs, possibly with very different
control flow. In particular, the rule for loops allows to relate
loops that do not do the same number of iterations. This is
essential for proving correctness of optimizations based on
vectorization, or when the optimization depends the input
message length.
The program logics are embedded in a higher-order
logic which can be used to formalize and reason about
mathematical objects used in cryptographic schemes and
also to carry meta-reasoning about statements of the program
logic. Automation of the ambient logic is achieved using
multiple tools, including custom tactics (e.g. to reason about
polynomial equalities) and back-end to SMT solvers. For
the purpose of this work, we have found it convenient to
add support for proof by computation. This tool allows
users to perform proofs simply by (automatically) rewriting
expressions into canonical forms.
4.2. Design choices and issues
Rather than building a verified verification infrastructure
on top of the Coq formalization of the language (a la
VST [4]), we opt for embedding Jasmin into EasyCrypt.
We choose this route for pragmatic reasons: EasyCrypt
already provides infrastructure for functional correctness and
relational proofs and achieves reasonable levels of automation.
On the other hand, embedding Jasmin in EasyCrypt leads
to duplicate work, since we must define an embedding of
the Jasmin language into EasyCrypt. Although we already
have an encoding of Jasmin into Coq, we cannot reuse
this encoding for two reasons: first, we intend to exploit
maximally the verification infrastructure of EasyCrypt, so the
encoding should be fine-tuned to achieve this goal. Second,
the Coq encoding uses dependent types, which are not
available in EasyCrypt. However, these are relatively simple
issues to resolve, and the amount of duplicate work is largely
compensated by the gains of using EasyCrypt for program
verification (also note that building a verified verification
infrastructure in Coq requires some effort).
4.3. Embedding Jasmin in EasyCrypt
The native language of EasyCrypt provides control-flow
structures that perfectly match those in Jasmin, including if,
while and call commands. This leaves us with two issues: 1)
to encode the semantics of all x86 instructions (including
SIMD) in EasyCrypt; and 2) to encode the memory model
of Jasmin in EasyCrypt.
Instruction semantics. Our formalization of x86 instructions
aims at being both readable and amenable to building a
library of reusable properties over the defined operations,
in particular over SIMD instructions. The first step is to
define a generic theory for words of size k, with the
usual arithmetic and bit-wise operations. The semantics of
arithmetic operations are based on two injections (signed
and unsigned) into integers and arithmetic modulo 2k. For
bit-wise operations, we rely on an injection to Boolean arrays
of size k. Naturally a link between both representations (int
and Boolean array) is also created, which allows proving
for example that shifting a word n  i is the same as
multiplying it by to_uint 2i.
Scalar x86 operations are formalized using the theory
for words, and useful lemmas about the semantics of these
instructions are also proved as auxiliary lemmas. For example,
the formalizations of shl and shr permit proving lemmas like
shl x i⊕shr x (k−i) = rol x i, under appropriate conditions
on i.
The semantics of SIMD instructions rely on the theories
for 128/256 bit words, but the semantics must be further
refined to enable viewing words as arrays of sub-words,
which may be nested (e.g., instruction vpshufd sees 256-bit
words as two 128-bit words, each of them viewed as an
array of sub-words). To ease this kind of definition, we have
defined a bijection between words and arrays of (sub-)words
of various sizes. Then vector instructions are defined in terms
of arrays of words.
Memory model. EasyCrypt does not provide the notion of
pointer natively. We rely on the concept of a global variable
in EasyCrypt, which can be modified by side effects of
procedures, to emulate the global memory of Jasmin and the
concept of pointer to this memory. A dedicated EasyCrypt
library defines abstract type global_mem_t equipped with two
basic operations for load mem[p] and store mem[p ← x] of one
byte, as follows:
type address = int.
type global_mem_t.
op "_[_]" : global_mem_t → address → W8.t.
op "_[_←_]" : global_mem_t → address → W8.t → global_mem_t.
axiom get_setE m x y w : m[x ← w][y] = if y = x then w else m[y].
From this basic axiom we build the semantics of load and
store instructions for various word sizes. The Jasmin memory
library then defines a single global variable Glob.mem of type
global_mem_t, which is accessible to other EasyCrypt modules
and is used to express pre-conditions and post-conditions on
memory states.
Soundness. The embedding of a Jasmin program into Easy-
Crypt is sound, provided the program is safe. This is because
the axiomatic model of Jasmin in EasyCrypt is intended to
be verification-friendly, and assuming safety yields much
simpler verification conditions and considerably alleviates
verification of functional and equivalence properties. This
assumption is perfectly fine, since Jasmin programs are
automatically checked for safety before being compiled
and embedded into EasyCrypt. As potential future work,
it would be interesting to make our safety checker certifying,
in the sense that it automatically produces a proof of
equivalence between the Coq and EasyCrypt semantics of
Jasmin programs—technically, this would be achieved by
formalizing in Coq a simpler semantics for safe programs,
and proving automatically that the two semantics coincide
for safe programs. The coincidence between the simpler
semantics in Coq and the Jasmin semantics would still need
to be argued informally.
Reusable EasyCrypt libraries. In the course of writing
correctness proofs for our use cases we have created a few
EasyCrypt libraries that will be useful for future projects. In
addition to the interchangeability of generic vectorization
modules Ops and OpsV which we mentioned in Section 2,
significant effort was put into enriching the theories of words
in order to facilitate proofs of computations over multi-
precision representations. Concretely, a theory was created
that permits tight control over the number of used bits within
a word (a form of range analysis), which is crucial for dealing
with delayed carry operations and establishing algebraic
correctness via the absence of overflows. The central part of
this library is generic with respect to the number of limbs, so
that operations like addition and school-book multiplication
can be handled in a fully generic way (here we rely heavily
on the powerful ring theory in EasyCrypt). When dealing
with constructions such as Poly1305, base on primes which
are very close to a power of 2, this means that only the
prime-specific modular reduction algorithm needs special
treatment. Moreover, this theory was fine-tuned to interact
well with SMT provers, enabling the automatic discharge of
otherwise tedious to prove intermediate results.
fn store2(reg u64 p, reg u64[2] x) {
[p + 0] = x[0];
[p + 8] = x[1];
}
proc store2 (p:u64, x:u64 array2) : unit = {
var aux: u64;
leakages ← LeakAddr [0] :: leakages;
aux ← x[0];
leakages ← LeakAddr [to_uint (p + 0)] :: leakages;
Glob.mem ← storeW64 Glob.mem (to_uint (p + 0)) aux;
leakages ← LeakAddr [1] :: leakages;
aux ← x[1];
leakages ← LeakAddr [to_uint (p + 8)] :: leakages;
Glob.mem ← storeW64 Glob.mem (to_uint (p + 8)) aux;
}
Figure 10: EasyCrypt code (bottom) instrumented for
constant-time verification of a Jasmin program (top).
4.4. Verification of timing attack mitigations
The EasyCrypt embedding of Jasmin programs is in-
strumented with leakage traces that include all branching
conditions plus all accessed memory addresses (this also
includes array indexes since an access in a stack array will
generate a memory access at the assembly level). It is then
possible to check that the private inputs do not interfere
with this leakage trace in the classical sense that, for all
public-equivalent input states x1 ≡pub x2, the program will
give rise to identical leakages `1 = `2. Figure 10 shows an
example of the generated instrumented EasyCrypt code.
Pleasingly, EasyCrypt tactics developed to deal with
information flow-like properties handle the particular equiva-
lence relation associated with co-called constant-time security
extremely effectively. In particular, EasyCrypt provides the
sim tactics which is specialized on proving equivalence of
programs sharing the same control flow (which is the case
here, as we are reasoning about two executions of the same
program). The tactic is based on dependency analysis and
also proved very useful in justifying simple optimizations
like spilling, which do not affect the control flow. In the
case of constant-time verification there is a very interesting
side-effect to the dependency analysis performed by this
tactic: it is able to infer sufficient conditions (equality of
input variables) that guarantee equality of output variables.
When applied to constant-time verification this means that,
when this tactic is successful (which was the case for our
use-cases) the user just needs to check if the inferred set
of variables are all public. We note that performing this
kind of analysis at the assembly level is usually hard. We
take advantage of the fact that Jasmin provides a high-level
semantics that makes it suitable for verification; in particular,
the clear separation between memory, stack variables and
stack arrays at source level greatly simplifies the problem.
5. Case Study: ChaCha20
We present the Gimli case study in Appendix B
Algorithm overview. ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, which
we describe as specified in TLS 1.3. It defines an algorithm
that expands a 256-bit key into 296 key streams (each stream
is associated with a 96-bit nonce) each consisting of 232
blocks (each 64-byte block is associated with a counter
value).2 ChaCha20 defines a procedure to transform an initial
state into a keystream block. The initial state is constructed
using the 256-bit key k (seen as eight 32-bit words), the
96-bit nonce n (seen as three 32-bit words), a 32-bit counter
b and four 32-bit constants c. Pictorially, the initial state
can be seen as the following matrix, where on the left-hand
side we show the arrangement of 32-bit words and on the
right-hand side we show the matrix entry numbering.
c c c c
k k k k
k k k k
b n n n
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15
The state transformation, which is repeated for 10 rounds,
is based on the following operation that acts upon four 32-bit
words at a time:
Qround(a, b, c, d):
a← a+ b;
c← c+ d;
a← a+ b;
c← c+ d;
d← d⊕ a;
b← b⊕ c;
d← d⊕ a;
b← b⊕ c;
d← rol d 16;
b← rol b 12;
d← rol d 8;
b← rol b 7;
Return (a, b, c, d)
Each round updates the state by gradually modifying
the state, four words at a time using the Qround function
above, according to the following sequence of 4-word selec-
tions: (0, 4, 8, 12), (1, 5, 9, 13), (2, 6, 10, 14), (3, 7, 11, 15),
(0, 5, 10, 15), (1, 6, 11, 12), (2, 7, 8, 13) and (3, 4, 9, 14). The
final keystream block results from the XOR combination of
the output of the 10 rounds with the initial state.
Our implementation. We have defined and proved two
versions of ChaCha20, one relying only on scalar operations
(no vectorization) and the second one relying on AVX2.
The AVX2 version combines two approaches to the
optimization of ChaCha20: for short messages (up to 256
bytes) we follow the lines of [21], whereas for large messages
we adopt the strategy of OpenSSL. Both approaches were
ported to Jasmin, and further optimization of instruction
selection, scheduling and spilling was conducted to obtain
additional reductions in cycle counts.
Both approaches rely on vectorized instructions, but with
different parallelization approaches. For small messages, two
(for messages of up to 128-bytes) or four keystream blocks
are computed at a time, as there are enough 256-bit registers
available to enable the parallel computation of some steps
2. The typical composition with Poly1305, also adopted in TLS 1.3,
uses ChaCha20 with counter 0 to generate the key material for Poly1305;
the keystream generated for increasing counters starting at 1 is used
for encryption by XOR-ing with the plaintext. Poly1305 is then used to
authenticate the ciphertext (prefixed with any metadata that must also be
authenticated) after adding a length-encoding padding. We analyse the two
algorithms in isolation to facilitate comparison with other implementations,
and because the verification challenges are significantly different.
within the same block using a dedicated state representation.3
For long messages, this no longer pays off due to the need for
spills, and we rely on sixteen 256-bit registers, which permit
storing the states for 8 block computations using a direct
paralellisation approach that replicates a fast implementation
of a single block.
In the next section we give detailed performance bench-
marks for our code, and compare to existing implementations.
Next, we describe how, in addition to being the fastest, our
code is also proved functionally correct.
Formal verification. The scalar and AVX2 versions have
(almost) the same specification, which corresponds to the
HACL? specification, with some differences we present
later. Similarly to what we did for Poly1305, we define
an EasyCrypt imperative reference implementation and show
that it satisfies HACL? functional specification using Hoare
logic. Then, we prove the equivalence between this reference
implementation and both of our optimized implementations.
The main challenge when proving correctness of the
imperative specification lies in memory operations. The
imperative specification stores ciphertext blocks eagerly (512-
bits at a time), while the functional specification stores the
full ciphertext in one go at the end. Therefore, we need a
condition ensuring that stores do not erase the fragment of
the initial plaintext that remains to be encrypted. Formally,
we require that plain+ len ≤ output ∨ output ≤ plain.
Proving equivalence with the scalar optimized imple-
mentation is relatively straightforward. The main difficulties
come from optimizations of the memory operations. Indeed,
in the optimized version we use 64-bit accesses whenever
possible, instead of byte-level accesses as in the reference
implementation. This allows to save spilling and to reduce
the number of loads and stores by a factor of 8.
The proof of the AVX2 version is more intricate. There
are two different implementations for short messages and
long messages. However, we adopt the same proof strategy
in both cases. We describe the long message case. First we
change the control flow of the main loop, so that each loop
iteration computes 8 independent states. Then, we lay the
groundwork for vectorization: rather than manipulating 8
arrays of sixteen 32-bit words, we now manipulate sixteen
arrays of eight 32-bit words (here we leverage EasyCrypt
automation significantly). Finally, we prove the we can use
AVX2 instructions to replace multiple scalar instructions.
Again, the main difficulty is to deal with optimized memory
access operations, which now uses 256-bit loads and stores.
At this point, the 8 states are represented by a 16× 8 matrix,
which needs to be transposed in order to be XOR-ed with the
plaintext (using 256-bit operations) and stored in memory.
For performance reasons, this is done in two steps, each
dealing with half of the matrix. Because of this, we need a
slightly stronger restriction on the input and output pointers
3. Four 256-bit registers are used to store two initial states for two
successive counters, which permits computing four lines of code in Qround
with only three vector instructions, simultaneously for the two states. The
round is completed by permuting the states, again using vector instructions,
and repeating the same technique to compute the last four lines in Qround.
than in the scalar version. They need to be either equal or
to point to disjoint memory regions. Formally, we require
that (plain = output∨plain+ len ≤ output∨output+ len ≤
plain).
6. Benchmarks
Methodology. The performance evaluation of the Jasmin
implementations of ChaCha20 and Poly1305 was carried out
using the benchmarking infrastructure offered by SUPERCOP,
version 20190110. All measurements were performed on
an Intel i7-6500U (Skylake) processor clocked at 2.5GHz,
with Turbo Boost disabled, running Ubuntu 16.04, kernel
release 4.15.0-46-generic. The available compilers for all
non-Jasmin code were GCC 8.1 and CompCert 3.4. Unless
explicitly stated otherwise, GCC was used.
Baselines. Our benchmarks compare the new Jasmin im-
plementations to the fastest implementations for the same
primitives and architecture in the following cryptographic li-
braries: OpenSSL, HACL? and Usuba. We integrated external
libraries in SUPERCOP by compiling them into static libraries
and renaming symbols to remove naming collisions; this is
particularly important for libraries which we compiled using
different compilers for comparison—for instance HACL? was
compiled with both GCC and CompCert. A small patch to the
SUPERCOP benchmarking scripts was also added to include
these libraries in the set of evaluated implementations. Finally,
we created a binding to connect these implementations to
the API that SUPERCOP requires for evaluation. Concretely,
we implemented APIs crypto_stream_xor for ChaCha20
and crypto_onetimeauth for Poly1305.
Results. Figure 11 shows the benchmarking results of our
implementations of ChaCha20 and Poly1305 in comparison
to the prominent alternatives in terms of performance. We
emphasize that in this comparison our code is the only
one verified for functional correctness, safety and so-called
constant-time security (HACL? is compiled with non-verifed
GCC). The comparison with OpenSSL for small messages
should be taken with a grain of salt, as there is some overhead
due to binding with SUPERCOP using the C API.
For ChaCha20 the figure shows a clear difference be-
tween non-vectorized and vectorized code and our imple-
mentation essentially matches OpenSSL as messages grow
(we are measuring amortized cycles per byte). In particular
note that, for non-vectorized implementations, the C code
of HACL? is not much worse than OpenSSL’s assembly.
The efficiency boost of vectorization is significant, even
for relatively small messages. This gives relevance to our
results, as we now support fully verified vectorized assembly
implementations.
For Poly1305 we compare to HACL? and OpenSSL’s
best implementation, which has a structure similar to ours
and uses non-vectorized code for small messages. We can
see that our implementation is again the fastest and, more
importantly, that vectorized code is once more crucial to
make the most of the computational platform (visible for
large messages). Interestingly, the figure shows that OpenSSL
seems to switch from non-vectorized to vectorized code at
around 128-byte messages, whereas our implementation does
this at 256-bytes and this seems to be advantageous.
Figure 12 shows a comparison to verified code, where
HACL? is now compiled with CompCert. For ChaCha20, we
show both our vectorized and non-vectorized implementa-
tions, so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a big advantage
in bypassing the compiler, even if not relying on vectorization.
Indeed, our non-vectorized code is still roughly ×2 faster
than HACL?, while our vectorized code is about ×10 faster.
For Poly1305 we compare both to HACL? and to non-
vectorized OpenSSL code verified in the Vale framework [15]
(here the comparison is assembly to assembly and so it
is precise). The fine-tuning of our implementation shows
in the comparison to the Vale-verified OpenSSL code (the
dashed line depicts non-vectorized Jasmin code even for large
messages for comparison). The difference to HACL? in this
case is huge, both for non-vectorized and vectorized code,
and it is due to the intensive use of algebraic operations.
As a final note, we emphasize that we do not claim
that ours is the only verification framework that permits
achieving such results: for example, the vectorized Poly1305
code from OpenSSL from Figure 11 could be verified
using Vale or some other framework and closely match our
code’s performance. The intended take away message from
this section is rather that our methodology and framework
permit achieving this for new implementations, which can
incorporate ideas for speed optimization and functional
correctness proofs from cryptographers and further fine-tune
them using Jasmin.
7. Related Work
Appel and collaborators prove functional correctness
of C implementations of SHA-256 [5], HMAC [12] and
HMAC-DBRG [31]. Their proofs are carried in the Verified
Software Toolchain [4], an interactive program verification
tool for C programs. Their verified implementations can
be compiled to assembly using CompCert [24], a formally
verified optimizing compiler for C. Their work does not
analyze the penalty of using a verified compiler, nor does it
provide any guarantee with respect to side-channels.
Zinzindohoue et al. [32] develop HACL*, a portable C
library that implements many modern cryptographic primi-
tives. Implementations are written in F? [28], a SMT-based
verification-oriented language, and formally verified against a
readable mathematical specification. By enforcing that secrets
are used parametrically, it is also possible to guarantee that
F? programs are protected against side channels in the crypto-
graphic constant-time model [2]. Verified F? implementations
are first compiled into C using Kremlin, a highly optimized
compiler from F? to C [26], and to assembly, using the
Clang compiler or the CompCert compiler. Their library is
deployed in Mozilla Firefox, Wireguard and other popular
products. Their evaluation shows their libraries to be as fast
as unverified C libraries, but for this one must assume that
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Figure 11: Comparison to non-verified code.
Top: ChaCha20. Bottom: Poly1305.
functional correctness and protection against timing attacks
is preserved by compilation.
In a similar way, Erbsen et al. [19] develop an infras-
tructure for generating verified C implementations of elliptic
curve arithmetic from high-level descriptions written in the
Coq proof assistant. In addition, their generated code is
protected against side channel attacks in the program counter
model [25], since it does not contain any branching statement.
As for HACL*, their verified C implementations can be
as efficient as the fastest unverified C implementations,
when compiled with a non-verified compiler. FiatCrypto
implementations are deployed in Chrome, Android and other
popular products.
Bond et al. [15] develop the Vale framework for prov-
ing functional correctness and side-channel protection of
cryptographic primitives. Implementations are written in
pseudo assembly and annotated with logical annotations.
For verification, implementations are translated to the Dafny
verifier and validity of the annotations (which entails func-
tional correctness) is checked using SMT solvers. Verified
implementations are then compiled from Dafny to assembly.
The performance of their code is similar to OpenSSL.
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Fromherz et al. [20] develop an approach based on F? for
proving correctness of C programs with inlined x64 assembly.
Their approach is based on defining a deep embedding of x64
assembly and formally verifying an executable verification
condition generator for x64 assembly programs. The latter is
used in combination with F? verification condition generator
for proving correctness proofs of hybrid programs. The
Kremlin compiler is then used to generate C programs with
inlined assembly, to get a performance similar to Vale.
Bo-Ying Yang et al [17], [29] develop highly automated
tools for proving functional correctness of efficient assembly
implementations of elliptic curve cryptography. The strength
of their approach is a combination of proof assistants and
automated verification tools.
These approaches target functional correctness, as well
as side-channel resistance and provable security. In addition,
many works focus exclusively on side-channel resistance
and/or provable security. In particular, there exist several
tools for proving constant-time security [2], [6], [27] or for
making programs constant-time by compilation [16], [30].
Finally, a recent work develops a certified compiler [11] that
preserves constant-time security.
8. Conclusion
We have developed a practical framework to build high-
assurance and high-speed assembly implementations. We
have shown the benefits of our approach by manually
optimizing and verifying functional correctness and security
against timing attacks of code for two primitives from the
TLS 1.3. ciphersuite.
There are several important directions for future work.
First, we intend to verify a richer set of cryptographic
primitives, including all the primitives used in TLS 1.3.
Second, we intend to develop a translation validation ap-
proach for automating equivalence proofs between reference
and vectorized implementations. Third, we intend to extend
Jasmin to support other architectures. In addition, it would
be of theoretical interest to develop a formally verified
(relational) verification condition generator in Coq.
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Appendix A.
Overview of Jasmin design choices
Jasmin [1] is a language designed for building efficient
and formally verified cryptographic primitives within a single
language. This entails empowering Jasmin programmers to
use different programming idioms for different parts of the
implementation, as shown in Figures 3, 8 and 9.
On one hand, Jasmin aims to provide the highest level
of control and expressiveness to programmers. Informally,
the essential property that Jasmin aims to achieve is pre-
dictability: the expert programmer will be able to precisely
anticipate and shape the generated assembly code, so as to
be able to achieve optimal efficiency. This means that the
programmer must specify the storage for program variables
(stack, register) and must handle spilling explicitly (the
compiler will fail if it cannot find a spill-free allocation).
Jasmin also ensures that side-effects are explicit from the
program code by treating flags as boolean variables; this
not only gives explicit control over flags, but also makes
verification of functional correctness and even constant-time
security significantly simpler, as all non-memory-related
instructions can be treated as pure operators.
On the other hand, Jasmin provides a uniform syntax
that unifies machine instructions provided by different micro-
architectures. The main purpose of this syntax is to ease
programming and to enhance portability.4 At the source level,
stack variables and register variables are interpreted simply
as variables; the storage modifier is only used as advice for
register allocation. In particular, at this level the memory is
assumed to be disjoint from stack storage. The compiler will
later refine this model and conciliate the fact that stack data
must reside in memory as well.
Jasmin supports (inlineable) function calls, which natu-
rally leads to a style of programming that favors modularity,
and supports high-level control-flow structures, rather than
jumps. Jasmin also supports functional arrays for describing
collections of registers and stack variables. This notation
leads to compact and intuitive code and simplifies loop
invariants and proofs of functional correctness. Arrays are
meant to be resolved at compile-time, and so they can only
be indexed by compile-time expressions. These can be used
to describe statically unrollable for loops and conditional
expressions, which permits replicating within the Jasmin
language coding techniques that are typically implemented
using macros in C.
These choices have no impact on the efficiency of the
generated code, as low-level cryptographic routines usually
have a simple control-flow, which is easily captured by these
high-level constructions. Moreover, it considerably simplifies
verification of functional correctness, safety and side-channel
security, and is critical to leverage off-the-shelf verification
frameworks, which are often focused on high-level programs.
Appendix B.
Additional Case Study: Gimli
Algorithm overview. Gimli [14] is a permutation designed
to be used as a component in the construction of block-
ciphers, hash-functions, etc. It operates on 384-bits, and
is optimized to offer a good security/performance trade-
off across multiple platforms, including the deployment of
countermeasures against side-channel attacks. It applies a
4. Platform-specific instructions are also available and can be used
whenever important, e.g., for efficiency. In particular, programmers may
always use a Jasmin dialect where there is a strict one-to-one mapping
between Jasmin instructions and assembly instructions.
inline fn gimli_body(stack u32[12] state) −→ stack u32[12] {
inline int round, column;
reg u32 x, y, z;
for round = 0 downto 24 {
for column = 0 to 4 {
x = state[column]; x = rotate(x, 24);
y = state[4 + column]; y = rotate(y, 9);
z = state[8 + column];
state[8 + column] = x ^ z << 1 ^ (y & z) << 2;
state[4 + column] = y ^ x ^ (x | z) << 1;
state[column] = z ^ y ^ (x & y) << 3;
}
if round % 4 == 0 {
x = state[0]; y = state[1];
state[0] = y; state[1] = x;
x = state[2]; y = state[3];
state[2] = y; state[3] = x;
}
if round % 4 == 2 {
x = state[0]; y = state[2];
state[0] = y; state[2] = x;
x = state[1]; y = state[3];
state[1] = y; state[3] = x;
}
if round % 4 == 0 {
state[0] = state[0] ^ 0x9e377900 ^32u round;
}
}
return state;
}
Figure 13: Gimli reference implementation in Jasmin.
sequence of 24 rounds to a 384-bit state, seen as a 3×4 matrix
of 32-bit words. Each round consists of three operations:
1) a non-linear layer implemented as a 96-bit fixed per-
mutation, which is applied to each 3-word column and
comprises bit-wise operations and entry swaps;
2) a linear mixing layer using two different matrix entry
permutations, one applied every fourth round and one
every second round;
3) a constant addition, applied every fourth round.
What makes Gimli an interesting example is that its speci-
fication is actually given as imperative pseudocode, which
we can write in Jasmin at the same level of abstraction as
shown in Figure 13.5
Implementation and formal verification. Our implemen-
tation of Gimli demonstrates the use of another set of
instruction extensions. As suggested in Gimli’s proposal [14],
we rely on SSE, which provides 128-bit registers and allows
for parallelization within a single block. In particular, we
process the four columns in parallel in the non-linear part
of each round. We chose this particular parallelization
approach because we are not optimizing Gimli for a specific
construction, but rather as a generic building block. Indeed,
when Gimli is used in specific constructions, parallelization
5. We note that for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 the original specifications
are also given as pseudocode; however we chose to present our reference
specifications as being the ones used in HACL? for the sake of interchange-
ability. We believe the fact we can adopt both styles of specification speaks
for the versatility of our approach.
across several blocks can be achieved using more powerful
instruction extensions, supporting wider vectors.
The proof of the SSE version of Gimli is comparatively
simpler to our other examples. In the vectorized version,
the state is an array storing four 128-bit values, each
corresponding to a line in the matrix. The linear operations
that permute entries within lines can be implemented using
shuffle instructions vpshufd 0xB1 and vpshufd 0x4E. Proving
the equivalence between the shuffle in 128-bits word and the
reference implementation is done by a simple reduction step,
as EasyCrypt’s semantics of x86 operations is computable.
A more intricate argument is needed to deal with the
implementation of an equivalent of a rol instruction for
vectors, which does not exist natively. This is based on a
24-bit rotation, which can be emulated by permuting bytes
using the vpshufb instruction. Proving the correctness of this
requires switching the way we view 128-bits words between
four 32-bits words and sixteen 8-bits words. Again, the proof
of this optimization is done by computation.
Appendix C.
Additional support Jasmin developers
Jasmin programs can be compiled to assembly, assembled
and linked to other programs. However, the Jasmin compiler
is partial: some valid programs may fail to be compiled.
For instance, for the sake of predictability, no temporary
variables are introduced to compile expressions; also, register
allocation does not introduce spilling and fails if not enough
registers are available. Moreover, the compiler correctness
proof does not provide guarantees for unsafe programs so,
even if a program does compile, running the generated code
is not a good means to obtain feedback on the semantics of
a source program.
To overcome these difficulties and be able to run spec-
ification programs during development—Jasmin programs
that should be easy to read but may fail to be compilable
or efficient—we have introduced an interpreter, i.e., an
executable small-steps semantics, of the Jasmin language.
